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PREFACE 
This paper describes the general structure of IIASA's 
food and agriculture model. Propositions on the existence 
of equilibrium are formulated and discussed, but no proofs 
are given. These will be published in a forthcoming report 
where the algorithms developed to numerically solve the model 
are also described. 
There are three chapters: 
Chapter I serves as a general introduction to 
the modeling system. 
In Chapter I1 the model is described in a formal way. 
In Chapter I11 the assumptions introduced in the model 
specification are discussed and their 
realism is assessed. 
iii 
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 . I IASA ' s  FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROGRAMME 
A central task of IIASA1s Food and ~~ricul'ture programme is to study the 
impact of national policies of both developed and developing nations on 
hunger and malnutrition in the world and to evaluate the consequences of new 
international agreements in the field of food and agriculture. 
The research strategy is to develop a simulation model containing about 20 
national models which interact through trade and capital flows. The model 
operates with a one-year time increment and has a time horizon of 15-20 years. 
Country experts independently'develop national models which should be linkable 
into one global model. 
The models should therefore satisfy basic linkage requirements. 
- International trade variables should follow a common commodity classifi- 
cation (i.c. 18 agricultural and 1 residual, non-agricultural commodity). 
- Imports and exports of commodities should be generated on a yearly basis. 
- Imports and exports should be functions of world market prices, which 
are insensitive to the absolute level of prices. 
The development of a theoretical and computational modelling framework along 
these lines, is the subject of the present report. 
2. A SYSTEM OF INTERLINKED, OPEN EXCHANGE MODELS 
There are n commodities, indexed i = 1, ..., n and 1 countries, indexed 
h = 1 ,  ..., 1. We consider a national model as a net import function 
depending on world market prices. Although a formal treatment must be post- 
poned until Chapter 11, we list the main characteristics of this net import 
function. Let ih be the net import of commodity i by nation h and pW be the 
1 i 
world market price of commodity i; we write the net imgort function as: 
Three basic requirements are imposed on it. 
(i) Net imports should be insensitive to the absolute level of prices (the 
functions should be homogeneous of degree zero in prices). 
(ii) The net import function should be continuous at all positive prices. 
(iii)The function should,- at positive prices, satisfy a balance of trade 
W W 
condition: Let kh(pl, ..., pn) describe the nation's deficit on its 
balance of trade (this function should be homogeneous of degree one). 
The balance of trade requirement can then be written as: 
n 
W W W 
z p: z: = kh(pl. . . . , pn) , for all (pl , . . . , pn) > o 
i=l 
At the international level demand should not exceed supply: 
W W  Depending on the assumed market conditions, the function k (p pn) can be h 1' 
specified. We define as a competitive international equilibrium the 
1 W W 
solution of ( 2 . 1 )  - (2.3) when 1 kh(pl, . . . , pn) = 0 for all 
h= 1 
W W (pl, ..., p ) 2 0 i.e. when ( 2 . 3 )  is the only balance condition imposed 
n 
at international level. 
In Chapter 11, para 2 a national model with domestic price policies, quota's 
on international trade and national buffer stocks is presented. We call this 
an open exchange mode2 ("open" because it has international trade and "exchange" 
because a one perlod lag in supply is assumed). As long as this model possesses 
a unique solution its net imports are functions of world market prices, which 
satisfy requirements (i)-(iii). Competitive international equilibrium is one 
of the modes for interlinking a system of open exchange models (Chapter 11, 
para 3 ) .  An international buffer stock agreement (Chapter I1 para 4) and 
a market segmentation agreement (Chapter I1 para 5) offer alternative modes. 
The economic realism and the institutional background for the assumptions 
made in Chapter I1 are evaluated in Chapter 111. 
The following diagram shows the general structure of the system's operation. 
- - .- .- - - 
, national level 1 1. Supply ( 
'meters 
I for ex- 
'. 
I 
! 4. Computation of 
,... 5. International Exchang 
Equilibrium 
The dotted lines indicate that the international model calls for the 
excecution of the national models, one after the other. 
3 .  MODELLING ECOPJOMIC EQUILIBRIUM AS A COMPLEMENTARITY PROBLEM 
We shall model the economic process by first describing the behaviour 
of individual agents and then integrating this behaviour through the 
imposition of overall physical and financial balance conditions, in the 
Walrasian equilibrium tradition. From the mathematical point of view, we 
shall restrict ourselves to a class of models called complementarity 
problems (see Cottle (6)).In order to illustrate the applicability 
of this mathematical tool, we first interpret the competitive equilibrium 
w 1 h  
model as a complementarity problem. Let z = 1 zi , i=l, ..., n, define 
h=l 
world net imports from commodity i; the competitive international model can be 
written as: 
With the additional property that prices can be normalized according to 
w W 1 pi = 1, that the solution p , should be strictly positive, and that 
i= 1 
(3.2) is satisfied at all positive prices. Equations (3.1)-(3.4) describe 
a complementarity problem which we can state more generally as: 
Find ($,,  ..., $ so as to satisfy, for k = 1, ..., r: 
r 
W W Obviously in the competitive model we have: r = n, q = -2  , $ = p. 
Examples of complementarity problems can be found in Cottle (6). Linear 
complementarity problems have received wide attention (see Cottle and 
Dantzig (7)).Bimatrix games, the optimality conditions of linear and 
quadratic programmes are linear complementarity problems. Kuhn Tucker 
optimality conditions and the equilibrium problems we shall study correspond 
to complementarity problems which can be nonlinear. 
Typically in an economic context, $ indicates some price, while q re- k k 
presents a quantity corresponding to that price and the complementarity 
equation (1 $ q = 0) is a representation of the requirement that revenue k k  
should equal expenditure (i.e. the strong version of Walras' Law). 
The economic equilibrium problems which we shall study have three symplifying 
characteristics: 
( a )  qk = q k ( i l ,  . . .$ i s  homogeneous o f  d e g r e e  z e r o  i n  (i l l  ... Q r ) .  
r 
(b) , . . .$ ) E Y ,  where Y i s  a  nonempty, c l o s e d ,  bounded, convex s e t  
r 
i n  t h e  nonnegat ive  o r t h a n t .  
( c )  q  = 0 f o r  a l l  , . . . Q r )  € Y .  
I 1 i 
The f o r m u l a t i o n  a s  a  complementar i ty  problem is of  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  because  
such a  problem p o s s e s s e s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t h a t ,  i n  i ts  s o l u t i o n  f o r  k = 1 ,  ..., r :  
i f  Qk > 0 t h e n  qk = 0 
i f  q  > 0 t h e n  k qk = 0 
T h i s  p r o p e r t y  may seem t r i v a l  from t h e  mathemat ical  p o i n t  o f  view, it h a s  
proven,  however, t o  be  v e r y  u s e f u l  f o r  r e p r e s e n t i n g  p o l i c i e s  w i t h  f i x e d  t a r g e t s  
w i t h i n  an  economic model. We c o n s i d e r  a  p l a n  w i t h  a  f i x e d  p r i c e  t a r g e t  and 
a  c o n s t r a i n e d  q u a n t i t y  f o r  each commodity. 
L e t  p b e  a  p r i c e  t a r g e t  f o r  commodity i. The p l a n n e r  wishes  t o  see t h i s  
i 
t a r g e t  r e a l i z e d  a s  l o n g  a s  an  a s s o c i a t e d  q u a n t i t y  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  unbinding:  
'i > 0 .  Otherwise  t h e  p l a n n e r  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  l e t  t h e  p r i c e  rise above t a r g e t .  
L e t  p  . b e  t h e  p r i c e  r e a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e n :  i 
I f  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  problem e x i s t s ,  it w i l l  s a t i s f y  t h e  p l a n n e r ' s  wishes  
b u t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t a r g e t  cannot  be  r e a l i z e d ,  does  n o t  by i t s e l f  
imply t h a t  t h e  model h a s  no s o l u t i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, e s t a b l i s h i n g  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  a s o l u t i o n  c l e a r l y  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  t e s t  f o r  t h e  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  b o t h  t h e  
model and t h e  p l a n  ( c f .  Chapter  111, p a r a  1 3 ) .  
The p l a n n e r  may wish t o  asso-cia te  more t h a n  one c o n s t r a i n t  t o  one t a r g e t ,  
implying t h a t  a s  l o n g  a s  one c o n s t r a i n t  i s  n o t  b i n d i n g ,  t h e  t a r g e t  shou ld  
be realized (cf. Chapter 11, para 2); one then writes 
Gi qIi (P) = 0 
and 
$i q2i (P) = O 
For an intuitive illustration of a case with one constraint associated to 
each target, we consider -a price target on the world market which 
is strived at through the operation of an international buffer stock. The 
formal model is presented in Chapter 11, para 4, but the role of complemen- 
tarity conditions can already be seen here. As long as, for a commodity, the 
buffer stock is not depleted, its price should not rise above target level, 
because the international agency running the operation is assumed to announce 
that it will sell at target price as long as its stock is not depleted. 
Let u be the final availability of stock and $i the upward deviation of i 
world market price from price target for commodity i. 
We then have, for i = 1, ..., n, the requirement that: 
if u. > O  $ i = O  
1 
and 
if ai > O  u . = O  
1 
This can also be written as: 
$ 2  0 1 u. 0 I $iui = 0 
1 -= 
where 
and 
As lonq as the structure of (3.9) is not explicitly described, we do not 
know how the buffer stock operation is financed and cannot establish existence 
of a solution, but the example illustrates how a market regulating arrange- 
ment can be represented within the framework of a complementarity problem. 
Chapter I1 
GENERAL FORNULATION OF THE MODEL 
1. PLAN OF THE CHAPTER 
The model is described in a general, formal way in para 1 4 .  An informal 
discussion of the empirical relevance and economic background of the main 
assumptions is postponed until Chapter 111. Proofs of the propositions are 
not given here and will appear in a forthcoming reprint. As a means of 
introducing the main hypotheses we first present a model of a closed 
economy with lagged supply (para 2). We then "operr" the economy by allowing 
international trade and by introducing a government which raises income tax 
and regulates the domestic market through price policies, quotas on 
international trade and through the operation of a buffer stock (para 3). 
P?e call this the open exchange model. If the solution to this model is unique, 
# 
it will, at positive international prices, describe net imports as a continuous 
function with the property that the value of net imports at world market prices 
equals a given trade deficit and that this function is homogeneous of degree 
zero in international prices and trade deficit. This makes it possible to 
regard the open exchange model as one actor, operating on the international 
market. Three versions of an international model are subsequently developed. 
- First a closed international economy, with an exogenously 
specified distribution function for balance of trade deficits 
without market regulating agreements. 
- Second, an international buffer stock agreement in which nations 
finance an international agency, which tries to keep world market prices 
within a given price band, by operating a buffer stock (para 4). 
- Third, an agreement on market segmentation is represented, in which 
one group of nations decides that it will try to keep world market prices at 
a fixed target level, by adjusting its net import. 
Each model is presented in four components: central market regulation, 
demand supply, finance and price formation. 
2. A CLOSED ECONOMY WITH LAGGED SUPPLY 
2 . 1  Csntral market regulation 
None 
2 . 2  Demand and s u p ~ z y  
There are n commodities (goods), indexed i=l, ..., n. 
n The set of normalized prices {pt E R+I I l P t l  I l  = I }  will be denoted P. 
There are m actors, indexed j=l, ..., m. 
For each actor j, demand is specified as a function xJ of prices and revenue 
(or income i.e. the amount of units of account available to the actor); 
a specified demand of actor j at the beginning of period t will be denoted xJ. t' 
1 
xJ : RP x R+ + R? 
For each actor j, supply is specified as a function of prices; a specified 
supply at the - end of period t will be denoted yJ. 
t' 
n Define a vector of weights y, y E R++ : y:= t and a satiation level 
1 - j 
Wtr  Wt 
E R++ : I,J := y . ~  j yt -1 
Five basic hypotheses are imposed on demand: 
(i) Homogeneity: demand is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income: 
(ii) Addins up: value of demand should not exceed the revenue and be equal 
to the revenue whenever weighted total demand does not exceed a specified 
satiation level. 
and 
v pt E P, {m jt lrn j=l, mjt E R ~ + I  y . L .X j j wt: v, : pt . Xj = m 
I t  t jt' 
(iii) Monotonicity: for each good demand does not decrease as revenue 
increases: 
1 - j - j V pt E P, m E R+:- : V m. > m : x (pt,mjt) x (ptrm 1 j t 3t jt j t 
(iv) Nonsatiution: when for any good price drops to zero, weighted total 
demand exceeds the satiation level: 
(v) Continuity : 
j V pi E p, m E R$+ : x (p, mjt) is continuous. j t 
Three basic hypotheses are imposed on supply: 
(vi) Lag: supply is brought to market with a one-period lag. 
( VI I Homogeneity : 
1 j j V pt E P : V A E R++ : y (pt) = y (Apt) 
( viii ) Boundedness : 
n j V p t E P  : 3 a E R + + :  a >  y (pt) 
Free disposal is explicitly considered as a commodity flow i.c. as a demand 
category. 
- 
where c is defined as 
A commodity balance is imposed: 
j j 1 x + s t =  ljyt-l j t 
2.3 Finance 
Each actor's revenue consists of the receipts from marketed supplies: 
j 
mjt := Pt Yt-l ( 2 . 5 )  
Dlagra~n 1 : A closed econorny with lagged production 
I I 
t- 1 
Legend : 
0 : actor 
---. : positive direction of a flow of goods 
: market 
t : time period 
1 
A , .., : income group I ,  ..., m 
S : free disposal activity 
2.4 Price formation 
A complementarity condition is imposed which restricts price adjustment 
by requiring that price of a good should be zero if its free disposal is 
positive : 
pt. st = 0 (2.6) 
This equation can also be regarded as a financial balance equation which requires 
that free disposal should finance itself. 
Diagram 1 describes the commodity flows in this model. 
2.5 Equilibrium i n  the closed economy wi th  lagged supply I I 
We remark that the model can be solved sequentially for every period, 1 
j m at given endowments {yt-l}j=l. We therefore can establish equilibrium indepen- I 
dently of the time period and formulate a proposition in which time subscripts 
j j j have been dropped and xJ is replaced by x , ytml by y-l etc. t 
Proposition I I 
rn n For all given values of iy3 1 E R++, with demand (2.1) satisfying 
-1 j=1 ''-1
hypotheses'2.2i-v, free disposal (2.3) and revenue determination (2.51, the 
model of the closed economy possesses a solution 
satisfying 
- the commodity balance (2.4) 
- the price restriction (2.5) 
and where p* >O. 
3. AN OPEN EXCHANGE ECONOMY WITH DO!ESTIC PRICE POLICY, QUOTAS AND BUFFER STOCK. 
3.1 Centpal Market Regulation 
We shall now introduce an open economy model, describing a trading 
nation, in which a government sees it as its central goal to achieve a price 
target. For this it has two instruments at its disposal: 
Trade instrument: net import z z E R ~ ,  is adjusted within fixed upper t' t 
and lower bound 
- 
Stock  instrument: Stocks , w w E R? , are bought on the market at the t-1' t 
beginning of period t and sold at the end of the period. Stocks are aajusred 
within fixed upper and lower bounds 
- 
W < W  < W  
- t =  t =  t (3.2) 
3.2 Demand and supp Z y 
Demand is described accordinq to equation (2.1) under hypotheses (2.2.1-v 
Supply is described according to equation (2.2) under hypotheses Q.2.vi-viii). 
The satiation parameters (y ,  w )referred to in hypotheses Q.2.ii, iv )will be 
t 
specified below. 
Free disposal: the surplus, once the lower $ound on net import and the upper 
bound on stock is reached, is disposed of freely: - 
Buffer stock: Stock adjusts in order to keep net import within bounds. This 
can be formulated sequentially for each period as the minimization of the 
A A A - deviation from a fixed target level w w E R? (w < w < w - 
t' t -t = t = t- 
A 
minllwt - w I over y t t 
j - J - w  < z  subject to 
-t= z < w t + St + Cjxt - Tjyt-~ t-l= 
Commodity balance is imposed: 
j j z = C.(xt - ytJ + Wt - W + S 
t I t-1 t 
We observe that (3.3) - (3.5) combined imply that for all p E P net imports t 
remain within the bounds (3.1), that stock remains below the upper bound but 
can fall below the lower bound (3.2), as illustrated in diagram 2. 
3.3 Finance 
Government activities are financed by taxation on revenue. 
Distribution of tax among income groups is specified by a function of prices, 
each group's supplies and total tax requirements: 
b : R? x R?? x R1 + R m 
Diagram 2 : ,Vet import, buf fer  stock, free disposal and demand for 
j 
P t > 0, f t  < pt - Lyt and comnodity balance s a t i s f i e d .  j 
I ! net  import 
1 I 
I 1 I ' buffer stock 
I I 
I 1 f ree  disposal  
- 
I11 . -it z I Z i t  2 z i t + .  = W 
l t  i t  , S  = O  it 
- 
IV . 2 .  = z 
It  -itf Q < w .  it = lt ' s = O  i t '  i t  
- v z . = z  
I t  i t  I W  = W i t  i t  , Sit 2 0  
The func t ion  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  hypotheses:  
(i) Homogeneity: t h e  a b s o l u t e  l e v e l  of  p r i c e s  and t a x a t i o n  does n o t  a f f e c t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of income t a x  over  income groups (homogeneity of degree  o n e ) :  
(ii) Add2'ng up: t h e  func t ion  f u l l y  d i s t r i b u t e s  t a x  requirements:  
( i i i )  Monotonicity: when t a x  i n c r e a s e s  f o r  one income group, it should n o t  
decrease  f o r  any, and v i c e  ve r sa :  
( i v )  Positiveness: each income group should have a -posit ive a f t e r - t a x  revenue 
a s  long  a s  t o t a l  a f t e r - t a x  revenue is p o s i t i v e .  
(v)  Continuity: t h e  func t ion  is cont inuous wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  p r i c e s  and 
t a x a t i o n .  
Revenue i t s e l f  equa l s  r e c e i p t s  from marketed s u p p l i e s  minus t a x :  
- 
We observe t h a t  t a x  can be p o s i t i v e  a s  w e l l  a s  nega t ive .  
A balance  of t r a d e  cond i t i on  is  imposed a s  an o v e r a l l  budget  equa t ion ,  which 
W 
s t a t e s  t h a t  n e t  impor t s  z eva lua t ed  a t  given i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e s  p should 
t '  t' 
be equa l  t o  a given d e f i c i t  on the balance  of  t r a d e ,  kt: 
W 1 W F o r g i v e n p  E R ? ,  k t €  R I p t .  (.X,yJ + w  ) + k t  Z 0: t J 1 t -1  
We s p e c i f y  t h e  s a t i a t i o n  parameters  ( y  w t )  in t roduced  i n  ( 2 . 2 )  a s ;  t' 
The government budget equation implied by the commodity balance (3.5) and 
W 
the balance of trade equation (3.6) (assuming that p and p are expressed t t 
in the same unit of account), is: 
expenditures on goods + net subsidies on trade = tax receipts + 
trade deficit + revenue from stocks. 
3.4 Price formation 
Price realization only deviates from target under explicitly 
I 
specified conditions. Let ir v E R f  and pt E R$ relate price realization t' t 
p E P to fixed price target 5 E RL according to: - t t 
Complementarity relations describe the restrictions on price adjustment. 
As long as either a buffer stock is unconstrained from below or a net import 
is unconstrained from above, price should not rise above target: 
As long as either a buffer stock is unconstrained from above or a net import 
is unconstrained from below, price should not fall below target: 
v . (zt - Et) = 0 t 
- 
Vt. (wt - Wt) = 0 
Price should be zero when free disposal is positive. 
We again observe that this equation can also be looked at as a financial 
balance equation requiring that free disposal should finance itself. The free 
disposal equation (3.3) together with condition (3.13) thus describe a demand 
system with zero budget, which performs as a buffer stock, to prevent prices 
from becoming negative. 
Diagram 3 illustrates the commodity flows in this model. 
Diagram 3: Open zxchange economy v i t h  buf fer  stocks and Zagged supply 
Legend: see diagram 1 1) 
G : government 
S : free disposal 
1 m 
A,. .,A : income group 1, .., m 
All variables have been defined in t;xttexcept zP;zP = z -w 
t t t t 
3.5 Equi Zibriwn i n  the  open exchange mode Z 
As was the case with the model of the closed economy, the solution 
of the open exchange model can be established sequentially for each period. 
We therefore formulate a proposition in which the time subscript is dropped 
and y' is replaced by yJ w by w - ~  , zt by z etc. 
t- 1 -1 ' t-1 
-Rtaoposition 2 
With demand (2.11, satisfying hypotheses 2.2.i-v, free disposal (3.31, 
Suffer stock (3.41. tax distribution (3.61, satisfying hypotheses 3.3.i-v, and 
revenue determination (3.7) the following holds: 
j n For every given combination of supplies iyJ lrn y,lE R++ and initial stock 
-1 j-1, 
w E R ? ,  
-. 1 
for fixed 
W 
- world market prices p and balance of trade deficits k, 
- 
- bounds on net import: 2, z, 
- 
A - 
- bounds and target level on stock: w, w, w, 
.. 
- 
- price target p , 
such that 
the open exchange model possesses a solution 
satisfying 
- bounds on net import (3.1) : bounds on stock (3.21, commodity balance (3.5) 
- balance of trade (3.8) 
- restrictions on prices (3.10 - 3.13) 
and where 
j 
- f* < P * . L ~ Y _ ~  
3 .6  The nation as one actor, policy acijustment functions 
We formulate a proposition which establishes the possibility of 
W 
describing net import as a multifunction of world market prices p and 
balance of trade deficits k. 
To that end we assume that the bounds and target levels on buffer stock and 
the bounds on net import are specified as functions of world price and 
trade deficit, denoted . 
w : R? x R1 + R+ 
- 
(lower bound on buffer stock) , 
h 1 (target level on buffer stock) , 
t l : ~ ? x R  + R +  
- 
w : R? x R1 + R+ (upper bound on buffer stock) 
n 
z : R+ x R1 + R+ 
- 
(lower bound on net import) , 
- n 1 
z : R+ x R1 + R+ (upper bound on net import . 
Moreover, the target price is assumed to be a given function of world price 
and trade deficit: 
- n 1 n p : R+ x R -+ R++ (3.19) 
We assume that these functions satisfy the following hypotheses: 
W W (i) homogeneity: ~ ( ~ ~ , k )  E R? x R' : V A € ~ i +  : - w(p ,k) = - w(Ap , Ak) , 
A w A W - W W W W 
w(p ,k) = w(Ap ,lk), w(p ,k) = ;(Ap ,Ak), z(p ,k) = z(Ap I Ak) I 
z(pW,k) i ( A ~ ~ , A ~ )  
1 (ii) homotheticity: 3 N : R + + + R t +  , N(A)(v(~~,.~) E Rf x R1 : \I A E ~ f +  : 
W 
N(A) p(pW,k) = p(lp , Xk) . 
h - - - (iii) continuity: w, w, w, 2, 2 ,  p are continuous functions. 
- 
1 W W W -  W (iv) compatibility: ~ ( ~ ~ , k )  E RP x R : p .4(p .k) < k < p .z(p ,k) 
W W 
z(p rk) 2 z(p rk) 
- 
W A W W 
w(p ,k) 2 w(p ,k) L -- w(p ,k) 
w j w 
~ ( p  Ik) < zj~-l + w - ~  + ~ ( p  ,k). 
Let us denote the set of equilibrium net imports corresponding to a given I 
international price and trade deficit by Z*(P~,~) and define the set of normalized 
international prlces and trade deficits which allow a nonneqative demand as: 
We now def~nr! the national net. import multifunc-ti.on by assigning to it 
equilibrium net importe whenever this equilibrium is defined and by 
artificially defining it otherwise: 
n 1 
z 1  : R+ x R + IP(R") , z4 (pwlk) := (21 E R"( 3 Z* E ~ * ( ~ ~ , k )  : z 1  = Z* , 
if pW > 0 and pW.y + k > 0; 
- 1 
W W 
otherwise: z(pW,k) 2 2' F z(p ,k), p .z' = k) 
- - 
(3.21) 
Proposition 3 
If: - bounds and target on buffer stock (3.14) - (3.16) 
- 
- bounds on net import (3.17) - (3.181, 
- price target (3.19) 
satisfy hypotheses 3.6.i-iv 
and, if 
W W - for all feasible combinations (p .k1 E T(; - such that pW > 0 ,  p . ~ - ~ + k  > 0, 
the open exchange model does not possess more than one equilibrium solution 
-
~ * r  ~ * r  v*r  
then 
the net import multifunction Z', as defined by (3.21) possesses the 
following properties: 
(i W 1 homogeneity: '((p ,k)€~(y-~) : VKR- : Vz'EZf (pwlk) : z'EZ4 (ApW,Ak) 
W W (ii) additivity: ~ ( ~ ~ , k )  E T(Y-~I : V z1 E Z1(p ,k) : p .z8 = k 
W (iii) continuity: V(p ,k) E T(Y-~) : Za(pwlk.) is nonempty, bounded, closed. 
v(pW1k) E T($ - : grf (T; 2 ' )  is closed. 
W W - 
V(p ,k) E T(? - I pW > 0. p + k > 0 : Z1(pW,k) 
contains one single element. 
W W (iv) convexity: V(p ,k) E T : Z1 (p ,k) is convex. 
Proof is given in para 10. 
It follows from proposition 3 that whenever trade deficit and international price 
lie in the interior of T(y 1 ,  net import is a continuous function so that 
- 1 
the nation as a whole possesses all the properties of its constituting 
consumers except monotonicity and nonsatiation. When considering an economy 
with nations as basic actors, nonsatiation can be reintroduced artificially 
but monotonicity cannot be restored. Thus, although price policies, 
quantity restrictions and taxation can also be introduced at the inter- 
national level, the policies must be specified in such a way that they do 
not require monotonicity of the net import function. 
4 .  A CLOSED INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
4.1 CentraZ Mmket  Regula t ion  
None 
4 . 2  Demand Supp Zy 
We move to the international level and describe a closed 
international economy, indexed w, in which demand and supply are generated 
as net import by nations, indexed h, h E H ~ ,  which satisfy the conditions 
of proposition 3. For each nation we distinguish 
supply equals total supply by income groups and buffer stock: 
net import satisfies proposition 3 and is defined as: 
Nonsatiation is introduced by stipulating that one nation indexed 
dW, should possess this property. We call it the slack nation . 
Let HW := ih E H~ I h#dw) 
The slack nation has a net import function 
W 
It satisfies, for all p E R? the following hypotheses: t 
d w d w (i) homogeneity: V A E  ~ 1 + :  z (Apt) = z  (pt) 
w d w  d w (ii) adding up : pt.z (p  < 0, with equality whenever y.z (pt) 2 ut 
t -  
A A W A d w (iv) nonsatiariol: V : 3 = pkt, k#i, pi 2 P;t) : y.z (pt) > ut i 
We then impose : 
Free dis~osal: 
Commodity balance: 
4.3 Finance 
Trade deficits are distributed among nations in a way similar to 
the tax distribution among income groups within the nation. 
Transfer distribution functions distributes a total transfer to an inter- 
national agency, E R1 over all nations h E k. 
" : 
The function satisfies the following hypotheses: 
(i) homogeneity: the absolute level of prices and transfers does not 
influence the distribution of trade deficits over nations 
(homogeneity of degree one): 
(ii) adding up: the functions fully distribute the transfer 
(iii) continuity 
(iv) positiveness: each nation should be allowed positive demand as 
long as total value of demand is positive: 
No international agency is introduced, so that financial balance requires: 
nW = 0 t (4.7) 
4.4 Price  orm mat ion 
As in the closed economy, only free disposal introduces a res- 
triction on price formation 
Diagram 4 shows the commodity flows in this model. 
4.5 Equilibriwn i n  the closed internationa2 economy 
As in para 1.2, equilibrium can be established sequentially for 
each period. We therefore drop the time subscript in the formulation of 
the following proposition. 
- 
Proposition 4 :  
-h -h 
At all given level of supplies (y-l)hEH~ , y-l E R?+ , 
with - net import ( 4 . 2 1 ,  (4.3) satisfying proposition 3 and hypotheses 
(4.2.i-iv) respectively, 
free disposal (4.4) 
- transfer distribution (4.6) satisfying hypotheses (4.3.8-iv). 
the model of the closed international economy possesses a solution 
satisfying 
- commodity balance (4.5) 
- financial balance (4.7) 
- price restriction ( 4 . 8 )  
and where 
5. AN INTERNATIONAL BUFFER STOCK AGREEMENT MITH A FIXED PRICE BAND 
5.1 Central Market Regulation 
We introduce an international agency which sees it as its central 
goal to keep prices within between an upper and a lower bound. For this 
it has one instrument at its disposal: stock adjustment. 
Diagram 4 : A "competitive" international economy 
Legend: see diagram 1 
1 
N I N  l : nation 1,  dWI 1 
sw : f r e e  d isposal  a c t i v i t y  
n 
Stock instrument: Stocks u ~ - ~ ,  u t' u t E R+, are brought on the market at 
the beginning of period t and sold at the end of the period. Stocks are 
adjusted within fixed upper and lower bounds: 
5.2 Demand S u p p l y  
Net import, zh by nations h, h E ElW is as described by (4.2) , (4.3) . t 
Free dis~osal: 
Buffer stock: stock adjusts in order to keep commodity balance. This can 
- 
be formulated sequentially for each period as the minimization of a 
A ~ . , n  A deviation from a fixed target level, ut, ut E R+ I & ?f u t -  < t i 
+ - n 
where u , u E R+ are optimal in 
t t 
+ + - 
min I J u t J I 1 +  (Iu;IJ1overu t' u t 
A + - (5.3) 
subject to: u + u - u - u 
t t t t-l + hEH P w z : + s w = O  t 
Commodity balance: although implied by (5.3) is imposed for the sake of 
completeness : 
5.3 Finance 
W Buffer stock is financed by nations. Total transfer q is 
t 
distributed among them according to transfer distribution functions (4.6). 
A financial balance is imposed which requires that that total transfer 
should equal the value of the net increase in stocks, valued at current 
prices. 
5.4  Price Formation 
Price realization only deviates from target under explicitly 
specified conditions. 
w -w n 
Let p pt E R++ be fixed bounds within which the agency tries to 
-t' 
keep the international prices. 
- w  W W W 
Let ptl pt. vt E RS , pt E RI relate price realization to price 
target according to : 
where 
As long as limits on stocbs are ineffective, prices should remain within 
the bounds: 
As soon as stock level drops below target, the upper price bound becomes 
target and as soon as stock level rises above target, the lower price 
bound becomes target: 
Price target should be such that, at target prices the value of the 
stock should equal the value of target stock 
Price should be zero when free disposal is positive 
Diagram 5 illustrates the commodity flows in the model. 
5.5 EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL BUFFER STOCK AGREEMENT 
We observe that restriction (5.8) - (5.10) can alternatively 
be looked at as financial balance conditions. Restricion (5.9) is of 
special interest since it implies a kind of value preservation. 
Diagram 5:  A n  international! economy with buffer stocks 
Legend: see diagram 1 
1 2  
N , N' : n a t i o n  1, . . . , dW, . . . . , 2 
s : f r e e  d i s p o s a l  a c t i v i t y  
B : buf fe r  s t o c k  agency 
h~ A We call (pt.ut) the ex ante commitment. We also note that (5.8) implies 
that whenever a price is within the band the corresponding stock is at 
target level. Substitution of (5.7) .(5.8) into (5.5) yields an explicit 
transfer function : 
We see that the transfer, which we shall refer to as ex post commitment 
is equal to: 
ex ante commitment + financial consequences of price deviation from 
target - value of initial stock. 
Since equilibrium can be established sequentially for each period, we 
again drop the time subscript in the proposition on existence of 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 5: 
With net import (4.21 , ( 4 . 3 1 ,  free disposal (5.2) , buffer stock (5.31, 
transfer distribution (4.61, the following holds: 
For every given combination of supplies 
and initial stock 
A - for fixed - bounds and target level on stock: u, u, u 
- 
W -w 
- bounds on price target p p 
- 
such that 
the model of the international buffer stock agreement possesses a solution: 
satisfying 
- commodity balance (5.4), bounds on stocks (5.1), 
- financial balance (5.5) 
- price restrictions (5.6) - (5.101. 
and where 
6 .  AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON MARIGET SEGMENTATION 
6.1 Introduction 
A buffer stock agreement cannot, in the long run, keep prices 
away from a natural" equilibrium level: stocks will get overfilled or 
depleted within a few periods. A more adequate way to meet grice targets 
in the long run is to have net import itself adjust. We now describe an 
agreement in which one group of nations strives at a price +=get on the 
international market by adjusting its net trade wit!! that market. 
This segments the world into two internatioczl econonies: first the 
eccnomy of the rest of the world (economy indexed w = TI, and second 
the economy of this group (economy indexed w = 11). 
6.2 lode2 of  Economy I 
6.2.1 Central Market Regulation 
Central aim of the agreement among members of economy I1 
is to achieve a fixed price target. To reach this target, there is one 
instrument: adjustment of net trade. 
Trade instrument: net import by economy I is adjusted within fixed upper 
and lower bound : 
6.2.2 Demand - Supply 
I Net import by nations h, h E H is as descrihed by ( 4 . 2 1 , .  ( 4 . 3 )  
Free disposal 
Commoditv balance: 
6.2.3 F inance  
The n a t i o n s  i n  economy I do n o t  t a k e  p a r t  i n  t h e  a g r e e -  
ment and a r e  t h e r e f o r e  n o t  invo lved  i n  i t s  f i n a n c i n g .  They merely  s h a r e  
t r a d e  d e f i c i t s  among each o t h e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t r a n s f e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
f u n c t i o n  ( 4 . 6 ) .  
F i n a n c i a l  b a l a n c e :  
6.2.4 P r i c e  f o r m a t i o n  
I I 1 L e t  P v E R?, E R+ relate p r i c e  r e a l i z a t i o n  
I -1 t 
p E P t o  f i x e d  p r i c e  t a r g e t  p E G+ a c c o r d i n g  t o  _ t t 
Complementari ty r e l a t i o n s  d e s c r i b e  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p r i c e  a d j u s t m e n t .  
A s  long  a s  upper  bound on a g g r e g a t e  n e t  impor t  is i n e f f e c t i v e ,  p r i c e  s h o u l d  
n o t  r i s e  above t a r g e t  and v i c e  v e r s a :  
P r i c e  shou ld  b e  z e r o  when f r e e  d i s p o s a l  i s  p o s i t i v e :  
6.3 Model o f  Economy 11 
6 .3 .1  C e n t r a l  Market R e g u l a t i o n  
None 
6.3.2 Demand - S u p p l y  
Net import  by n a t i o n s  h ,  h E HI' is  a s  d e s c r i b e d  by ( 4 . 2 ) .  ( 4 . 3 ) .  
F r e e  d i s p o s a l  
Commodity b a l a n c e  
I Z h + Z  = O  
t 
6.3.3 Finance 
Transfer distribution is effectuated according to (4.6) 
Financial balance requires that the value of net imports by economy I 
should be covered by transfers: 
6.3.4 Price restriction 
Price should be zero when free disposal is positive: 
11 sII = 0 
Pt - t 
(6.11) 
6.4 EquiZibrium under the Market Segmentation Agreement 
We observe that equilibrium can be established sequentially, 
first for economy I and then for economy II..Since it can also be 
established sequentially in time, we drop time subscripts in the 
formulation of the proposition on existence. 
Proposition 6: 
With net import (4.21, (4.3), free disposal (6.2), (6.8) and transfer 
distribution (4.6), the following holds: 
For every given combination of supplies 
-I for fixed - target price, p 
I -I 
- bound on net imports by economy I, z , z 
- 
such that: 
the model of economy I possesses a solution 
which satisfies 
- bounds on net imports (6.11, commodity balance (6.31, 
- financial balance (6.4) 
- price restrictions (6.5) - (6.7), 
where 
> 0, PI* > 0 
and the model of economy I1 possesses a solution 
which satisfies 
- commodity balance (6.9) 
- financial balance (6.10) 
- price restriction (6.11) 
and where 
> 0 .  
Diagram 6 describes the commodity flows in the model. 
Diagram 6: An international agreement on market segmentation 
Legend: see diagram 1 
1 N , . . . I  N 
1 
: nations member of economy I 
p l + l  
. N l : nations member of economy 11 
s : free disposal economy I 
sII : free disposal economy '11 
C : agency managing the agreement. 
Chapter I11 
ECONOMIC REALISM OF THE ASSUMPTIONS 
1 .  GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
The national and the-international models in Chapter I1 are general 
equilibrium models in the Walrasian tradition. They describe individual 
behaviour of certain actors (consumers, nations, etc.) and then integrate 
this behaviour by imposing aggregate balance equations (quota, limits on 
stocks, financial constraints, etc.). They are general and not partial 
because they keep a comprehensive account of expenditures on goods and 
services. They are equilibrium models because overall physical balances 
and financial constraints determine the level of adjustment variables 
(e.g. prices and taxation). In the literature the term "disequilibrium 
model" also is used to indicate that prices are not the only adjusting vari- 
able. We do not follow that convention. We shall not enter the debat,e whether 
or not money should be considered as one of the goods in the models. Several 
conditions under which money can be left out of the model, the conditions 
for a dichotomy between money and other goods, are summarized in   egis hi ( 2 . 5 1 ,  
but clearly, in general, money plays a role of its own. In the applications 
to food and agriculture which were primarily envisaged for the models of 
1 Chapter 11, money only is a unit of account and not a store of value . 
It is for that reason that the national deficit was called deficit on the 
balance of trade. We thus only consider goods and services and disregard all 
monetary "commodities"; we shall see below how the model can be given a more 
general interpretation (cf. para 9 ) ,  but up to that point, goods are considered 
to be objects, the quantity of which can be measured physically and which are 
desired by income groups. Goods differ by physical characteristics or by 
'Fron] the price normalization rule applied in 11, para 2 follows that I 
n 
unit of account = Z pi, but one could formulate more generally: one unit 
i= 1 
n 
account = Z p.a.; a > 0 .  It is also possible to select a nonlinear 
1 1  i i= 1 
index as unit of account, see para 8.4 below. 
location in space; services are treated as goods. We suppose that the number 
of different goods is finite; goods are not distinguished by their location 
in time: we only consider present goods and no demand and supply for future 
goods. The main assumptions underlying the models will now be discussed and 
minor generalizations will be shown. Paragraphs 2-8 are rather technical 
and directly relate to Chapter 11, para 1, 2, 6. Para 9-11 are general 
and can be read independently. 
2. LAGGED SUPPLY 
We have assumed a one period lag in supply (hypothesis 11, 2.2.vi). 
From a theoretical point of view this approach is not uncommon because it 
is quite possible to graft a competitive or an oligopolistic supply module 
onto the exchange model through a multifunction y = y(pt, pt-l, . . . ) satisfying 
homogeneity and boundedness conditions (see e.g. Jasckold-Gabszewicz (15). 
If one looks however at supplies as production capacities and considers the 
actual production as this capacity minus increase in the buffer stock, then some 
adjustment of actual production is already present in the open exchange 
model described in Chapter 11, para 2. Note that demand covers both demand 
for inputs and for final goods. It is doubtful whether input demand can be 
formulated as a continuous function when production plans are generated in 
linear programmes but this is a matter we do not further dwell upon. 
The hypotheses II.2.2.viir viii on boundedness and homogeneity do not require 
further comment. 
3. DEMAND 
Demand functions have been introduced directly into the model of Chapter 11, 
para 2, without any derivation from utility maximization. This is done for the 
sake of simplicity. As pointed out by Barten ( 3 )  and others the homogeneity 
requirement (II.2.2.i) and the adding up requirement (II.2.2.ii) are the 
only requirements from utility theory which survive aggregation over con- 
sumers with differing preferences. Because we wish to set up a national 
model such aggregation cannot be avoided. The homogeneity requirement 
suffers from the shortcomings of the dichotomy discussed in para 1 
above, as long as money is not explicitly taken into consideration. The 
adding up requirement implies t h a t  savings a r e  disregarded.  I t  i s  poss ib le  
t o  overcome t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n  by adding a  savings function t o  the  demand system. 
The function should be homogeneous of degree one i n  ( m .  pt) and should 
lt '  
s a t i s f y  
f o r  a l l  m > 0,  pt E P j  t 
j  (ii) m j t  = pt.xt + g j t  I a l l  m LOI p t E P  j  t 
An example of an extended expenditure system (which does not  s a t i s f y  (i) 
however), i s  the  extended l i n e a r  expenditure system by Lluch and Powell ( 1 .  
A most e s s e n t i a l  and r e s t r i c t i v e  assumption on the  demand system i s  t he  mono- 
t o n i c i t y  requirement t h a t  a l l  goods have a  nonnegative propensity with respec t  t o  
income ( I I . 2 . 2 . i i i ) .  The condit ion obviously only i s  impcsed on the  
s h o r t  run propensi ty.  Empirical evidence a s  repor ted  i n  Powell (271, 
Nasse ( 2 4 ) ,  Brown and Deaton (51, fo r tuna te ly  suggests  t h a t  from an 
empirical  po in t  of view the  assumption i s  not  r e s t r i c t i v e .  
For nonsatiation condit ion I I . 2 . 2 . i ~ ~  t o  hold it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  
one income group s a t i s f i e s  it. This i s  not  a  very r e s t r i c t i v e  assumption 
expecia l ly  f o r  consumer goods. 
S a t i a t i o n  may occur bu t  import quota should be binding f i r s t .  The reason 
t o  impose the  nonsat ia t ion  assumption i s  t h a t  we wish t h e  balance of t r ade  
equation t o  be s a t i s f i e d ;  when a  p r i c e  is  zero,  t axa t ion  looses  g r i p  i n  
demand and i f  a  good with zero p r i c e  does not  v i o l a t e  a  quota c o n s t r a i n t ,  
a  zero p r i c e  i s  compatible with equil ibrium and the  balance of t r ade  
equation can be v io la ted .  
4. INVESTMENT 
One saving has been introduced, it i s  na tu ra l  t o  consider  investment. 
Investment can be regarded a s  a  component of e i t h e r  demand by income groups 
o r  buffer  stock demand. We observe t h a t  an aggregate investment function can 
a l s o  be introduced, which i s  dependent on p r i c e s  and can be l imi ted  by savings.  
5 .  TAXATION 
Taxation covers in the model direct as well as indirect taxes, but does 
not cover tariffs and subsidies on international trade. The tax distribution 
function implies a variable rate of taxation and monotonicity condition 
(II.3.3.iii) implies that when the taxation rate increases for some income 
group, it does not decrease for any groups. One might object to this that 
income transfers to one group imply higher taxes for t!e others but this can 
be taken care of by specifying tax functions such as: 
Here b (p ) is an (indexed) income transfer. Obviously only the second lj t 
component is required to exhibit weak monotonicity-with respect to taxation. 
As mentioned in para 3 above, private savings can be regarded as a voluntary 
tax and thus as a component of (5.1). In this way different types of taxes 
can be handled separately. Even tariff receipts can be decomposed into 
margins due to quota and margins due to the difference between target prices 
and world market prices, and both can be redistributed according to separate 
rules. 
6 .  BALANCE OF TRADE 
The balance of trade equation is the budget equation of the nation. 
Irrespective of the policies pursued by the nation's government, this equation 
has to hold. It is formulated in terms of an international unit of account 
w (one international unit of account = C pi). This is not restrictive because 
i= 1 
the balance of payments holds by definition.The limitation comes in with the 
requirement that the trade deficits are given for each nation, add up to zero 
for all world market prices and possess homogeneity property (II.3.3.iIii). 
This makes international capital flows, foreign exchange reserves, inter- 
national transfers of profits, interest and wages exogenous to the national 
models and the homogeneity requirement points at the dichotomy assumption 
referred to in para 1. International capital and income trznsfers are 
thus considered to be indexed, exchange rates have no implications for the 
model and foreign exchange reserves do not adjust internally. This brings 
us to the adjustment mechanism of the national model. Taxation is the variable 
which adjusts until balance of trade is satisfied. In a more general application 
of the model the foreign exchange demand would be an obvious candidate as 
an adjusment variable. 
7. POLICY TAZGETS 
The open exchange model considers policy targets on domestic prices, on 
net imports and on buffer stocks. There is a hierarchy between these targets. 
The quotas on net imports and the limits on stocks have to be satisfied in 
any equilibrium. The price target has to be satisfied as long as it does not 
violate limits on stocks and the stock target finally has to be satisfied 
only as long as the price target is not endangered by the effectiveness of 
a quota. 
The realism of such a construction is hard to assess. National governments do 
impose quotas on international trade and domestic price policies or tariffs 
are also quite common, both in developing and in developed countries. If a 
quota should only be allowed to overrule the target level of buffer stocks, 
but not the target level of prices, then we would have a model in which 
quotas only appear as parameters in the demand function for stocks but not 
as restrictions on the model as a whole. This would produce a very simple 
structure of a national model with domestic price and buffer stock policy only 
In such a model the first task of a buffer stock, demand stabilization would 
still be performed but not the second one, price stabilization. 
If, on the other hand a component of stock demand should overrule price 
policy, this component should be taken as part of minimum stock demand 
and if it should also overrule quotas it should be treated as part of 
the balance of trade deficit. The hierarchical formulation is therefore 
more general than might appear at first sight. The model would however, 
gain in generality if a decoupling was made possible between the central 
price target which is realized through a system of tariffs/levies and 
the price targets supported by the buffer stock. One would let a price drop 
below or rise above the central target until certain bounds are reached. 
Within these bounds stocks would remain at their target level and only 
when the bounds are reached would the buffering start. This would represent 
a buffer stock policy with a price band. 
General equilibrium models with tariffs are a standard tool of international 
trade theory (see e.g. Kemp (19) or Negishi (25) and the computation of 
2 
equilibrium with tariffs has been studied by Shoven and Whalley (30) . 
Quotas have received much .less attention. The reason for this is probably 
the fact that in equilibrium the tariff equivalent of a quota and the quota 
equivalent of a tariff can easily be computed (see e.g. S. Bhagwati "on the 
equivalence of tariffs and quotas" in (4). In a m~del with one single utility 
maximizing consumer per nation, Dixon ( 8 ) ,  Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck (13) 
and Takayama and Judge (341, introduce quota explicitly. Only Ginsburgh and 
Waelbroeck treat the implication of a combination of tariffs and quotas. 
The case with several income groups does not seem to have attracted much 
attention. 
From an empirical point of view, tariffs and quotas have the same effect: 
a change in domestic price. But in a dynamic sense a quota is rather dif- 
ferent from a tariff, especially under retaliation, see Rodriguez (29) and 
Fishelson, Flatters (121, Sweeney, Tower, Willet (32) and Ohta (25). 
Quotas and tariffs are often imposed on very specific commodities so that 
it may be very hard to measure them at an aggregate level. One often has 
to ascribe a margin between domestic and world market prices to tariffs 
and to quotas according to some prespecified rule. Quotas nevertheless 
permit to introduce goods with a limited tradability into the model. Due 
to infrastructural restrictions, import and export capacities are res- 
tricted in the short run. To reflect this, quotas can be introduced as 
"flexibility constraints" and serve as a useful calibration device for a 
simulation model. Because of the complexity of the price-quantity interaction 
tariffs cannot play this role so effectively 
'Within the context of the Scarf algorithm. In this approach domestic and 
international equilibrium are treated simultaneously so that the domestic 
equilibrium is not required to be unique. 
Buffer stocks have, according to Turnovsky (36) mainly been studied in a 
partial equilibrium context and not in a multicommodity general equilibrium 
framework as in Chapter 11, para 2 and 4. We observe that the term "stock". 
can be replaced by "demand" because we do not need, in the existence proof, 
the property that demand is carried over to the next period. The combination 
of quotas and buffer stocks is of special interest because it becomes possible 
to describe the behaviour of marketing boards, buying up surplusses on the 
domestic market and selling on the world market, accorsing to some 
perceived relation between exports and worl2 prices, iz En attempt to 
maximize net foreign exchange receipts. 
8 .  POLICY ADJUSTMENT FUNCTIONS 
5.1 Domestic targets as functions of world m k e t  prices and trade d e f i c i t s  
In Chapter 11, para 3 target adjustaent functions were introduced in the 
open exchange model, the targets being functions of wcrld market prices and 
trade deficits. Price targets were required to be generated 3y homothetic 
functions and quantity targets by functions which were homogeneous of degree 
zero. These restrictions were imposed in order to obtain net import functions 
which are homogeneous of degree zero in world market prices. We give two 
examples of such functions. 
Let ow E R+ be an index of world market prices 
W 
which is strictly positive for all p E pW and homogeneous of degree one 
W 
t 
W 
in p The simplest example of such a function would be ow- = !pit, t' but more 
generally we have: t' 1 
This index may now be used to specify target adjustment functions. Homo- 
geneity of degree zero is then obtained by expressing all prices in terms of 
the index or by multiplying all fixed price targets by this index, for 
example : 
- W 
: = (1 + ~ ~ ) p ~ ~  i = 1, ..., h (tariff (8.3) Pit 
i = h + l ,  ..., n (levy). 
this yields the same net import as: 
Equation system (8.31, (8.41 is homogeneous of degree one, while (8.51, 
(8.6) is homogeneous of degree zero. 
8.2 Domestic targets as functions of domestic prices 
In the open exchange model (Chapter 11, para 2) both price and 
quantity targets are functions of world market prices only. One can imagine 
however, policy targets to be also a function of domestic prices,(more generally 
of the vector (pt, ptr vt). For the quantity targets (quota and buffer 
stocks) no problem arises as long as the target adjustment functions are 
continuous, bounded for all world market prices and domestic prices , 
homogeneous of degree zero both in pW and in (pt, ", Y ) and satisfy 
t t 
the constraints imposed on them. It is more difficult but also more inte- 
resting to investigate the consequences of taking price targets as 
functions of price realizations. 
If, however, the price adjustment function is not adequately specified, 
it is possible to obtain solutions with several degrees of freedom; for 
example, if one chooses p = p as a specification, all possible price targets 
- - 
t t 
p (p E PI are in the equilibrium set. It would be interesting if one t t 
could use this degree of underdeterminateness of the model in order to specify 
new constraints, e.g. policies across markets, specifying for example that 
the price target on market i should be adjusted in order to keep the price 
on market j at target level when quota on market j are effective and buffer 
stocks are depleted. This would imply complementarity conditions of the form: 
Such restrictions fall outside the scope of our present methodology and 
further research is needed in this direction, but the specific case will be 
handled now in which all price targets are tied to one index of current 
1 prices o (p) , o (p) E R++. 
8.3 AZternative normazization rules 
The discussion will proceed in terms of the open exchange model 
but applies to the international models as well. Throughout Chapter I1 
prices have been constrained to the "simplex" P: = {p E ~ $ 1  1 1 = 11. 
From an economic point of view this seems to yield a highly unrealistic 
unit of account. We therefore wish to consider a nore general normalization 
rule and unit of account. 
Let o(pt) = 5 be this normalization rule (and o(p )/lt t!he >=-it of account), t t 
and let 
be the price set , 
where 
(i 5 is strictly positive, t 
(ii) o(p ) is homogeneous of degree one in p 
t t8 
(iii) for all p > 0 ;  o(pt) > 0 t 
Let the price targets be formulated as functions homogeneous of degree 
- 
one in o (p ) , then for o (p ) = 5 , pt is fixed. t t t 
We can then proceed with existence proof and computation keeping price realization 
constrained to the "old" normalization (p E PI. The existence proof is t I 
unaltered since we only need the property that the price target should be I 
bounded and positive. We owe this flexibility to the introduction of the I 
scaling factor on price target (p 1 .  Let p* be the equilibrium price. t t 
We know that p* > 0 and thus o(~*) > 0 (by iii) and can renormalize from t 
N - 
t 
p* E P to p:* E P(dt) by dividing t 
We observe that, when quantity targets are functions (homogeneous degree 
- - 
zero) of the new unit of account, (o(pt)/dt), one can again set o(p ) = dtr t 
calculate the level of the targets and proceed with the existence proof 
(and with the algorithm) but the approach works only as long as all targets 
are functions of the same unit of account. 
9. FIXED PRICE EQUILIBRIUM I N  THE OPEN EXCHANGE MODEL 
In recent years several authors have described allocations of resources 
in an economy where prices are fixed at a value which may not achieve equilibrium 
between supply and demand in the classical sense. Barro and Grossman (21, 
Dreze (9), Malinvaud (21) have designed such models, especially for macro- 
economic applications, e.g. description of Keynesian unemployment, 
functioning of centrally planned economies, inflation. The models are based 
on the principle that quantity constraints (rationing schemes) are imposed 
on the individual actors. The issue under study is whether a qiven rationing 
scheme can generate an equilibrium at an arbitrarily fixed  rice level or 
within bounds on that level. We have seen that the open exchange model 
also describes price rigidities. But instead of rationing, net import and 
buffer stock adjustment generate a price rigidity. The degree of generality 
of the model is enhanced by the fact that limits can be imposed on the 
quantity adjustment so that it only prevails over price adjustment within 
a certain range. 
We summarize the main*differences between the open exchange model and 
the equilibrium models with quantity rationing, as described by Grandmont, 
Laroque, Younes (141, as follows: 
Open exchange mode2 Quantity rationing mode2 
- Individual actors only receive - Individual actors receive rations 
prices and taxes as signals. and fixed prices as signals. 
- Price rigidity is effectuated - The price rigidity is implemented 
through an adjustment of net through an adjustment of rations. 
demand, either from the inter- 
national market or from the 
buffer stock. 
- Both price and quantity adjust- 
men t . 
- Quantity adjustment only. 
The open exchange model can also be interpreted along macro economic lines. 
Suppose that there are three goods: first, money, is taken to be an untradable 
good for which the central bank pursues a buffer stock policy. Its target 
price is one and the normalization rule is expressed as a price index: the 
central bank tries to maintain the purchasing power of money at a stable level. 
Second, labour is also an untradable good. In terms of.the price index, wages 
are rigid; the rigidity is implemented by an unenployment scheme which buys up 
labour at fixed (indexed) price. Third, a price and 2 den232 stabilization 
policy are implemented in the commodity market. The questions to be asked 
might be "what would be the consequences of cuttfng'into the lmemployment 
scheme, of a tight money policy, etc?". Tne model can L2 2rincicle answer 
this type of question. A more difficult and yet unsolved question would be 
"Which price target should the central bank pursue in order 23 reduce un- 
employment without reducing real wages?". This is a question "across markets"; 
its answer poses the problems referred to in para e .3  above. The international 
model can be given analogous macro economic interpretation. 
The importance of buffer stocks as a demand stabilization tool has already 
been stressed in 1946 by J.M. Keynes (20), who wrote: "Superimposed 
on the meaningless short period swings affecting particular commodities and 
particular groups of producers, there is the fundamental malady of the trade 
cycle. Fortunately the same technique of buffer stocks, which has to be called 
into being to deal with the former problem, is also capable of making a large 
contribution to the trade cycle itself". 
lo. UNIQUENESS OF DOMESTIC EQUILIBRIUM 
The desire to obtain the capability of individually solving national models 
and to keep the dimensions of the international model as low as possible, has 
led us to impose the uniqueness requirement. As explained in Arrow-Hahn, 
Chapter 9 (11, there is no prior reason why a general equilibrium model 
should possess only one single equilibrium. On the other hand multiplicity 
of solutions points to the fact that the model is not fully specified because 
it does not explain the choice between solutions. 
We now turn to the assumptions which are specific to the international model. 
11. ONE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
There is only one international market in the model; transportation costs 
are disregarded as well as discrimination. This simplification is introduced 
for the sake of computational convenience. If a trade matrix had to be generated 
we would in principle have to find the terms at which each nation trades 
with each other nation in each good. In a partial equilibrium setting these 
problems have been handled by Takayama and Judge ( 3 4 )  with quadratic pro- 
gramming algorithm; in a general equilibrium setting Liis is an immense 
task however, although not fundamentally impossible. FA0 ezta (10) suggest 
that international transportation costs (the US% narqic betweec export value 
including cost-insurance-freight1' and "free on board" impcrt values) amounts 
to 8-9% of total import value for agricultural commodities in the period 
1971-1976 and less than 6% for overall trade. 
On the basis of these considerations it was decided to disregard the matrix 
of international trade. The margins between import prices and export prices 
as well as the differences between countries in unit values on import and 
export, can be handled by treating "transportation" as a complementary demand/ 
supply for nonagricultural services. 
12. NO INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET 
International prices are expressed in an international unit of account. 
Countries can provide one another with amounts of units of account which are 
not the payment for goods and services, this is the deficit/surplus on the 
balance of trade. The international system is closed, so the deficits have to 
add up to zero. The deficit plays at the international level the role of the 
income transfer at the national level (cf. para 5 above). Again all objections 
against the dichotomy assumptions can be raised here. 
13. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
13.1 Internal us. external agreements 
We distinguish between internal and external agreements. In an 
external agreement a group of countries agrees to influence the state of 
the rest of the world while in an internal agreement targets are formulated 
which do not directly affect other countries although there may be an indirect 
impact. A cartel typically is an external agreement while a customs union or a 
bilateral trade agreement are internal agreements. Internal agreements can be 
modelled without changing the basic structure of the com2etitive model. The 
countries with the agreement can be seen as a group which o2erates as a unit 
on the world market, facing world market prices zrd-SaLa.?co, of trade restrictions 
just as a country does. In external agreements the countries mzking the 
agreement explicitly try to influence the value of Lhe parameters they face from 
the outside i.c. the world market prices. We Ere nct in a position to endo- 
genously generate international agreements and the applic&ilFty of possible 
# 
agreements is hard to assess. The main purpose in m~deilinc then lies in testing 
their consistency and evaluating their consequences. 
13.2 Tests for an international agreement 
A new international agreement has its origin in an idea, an 
abstraction. Modelling can be a helpful tool in developing this idea. Once 
a mathematical model of the agreement has been formulated, one can perform 
tests on it. 
We distinguish: 
(i) tests on the logical consistency of the agreement. 
(ii) tests on the explicitness of the agreement. 
Ad (i): logical consistency 
( 1 )  Internal logical consistency. 
Here the consistency of targets and constraints must be evaluated. 
Participants should not be unwilling to carry the financial consequences of 
the agreement and targets should not be conflicting (if they do not stand in 
a hierarchical relation to each other). The conditions on the parameters of 
the models in Chapter 11, para 4, 5 mainly reflect this. 
(2) Consistency with a model of the real world. 
An agreement can be internally consistent but inconsistent with a given, con- 
sistent model of the real world. This can obviously be due to an inadequacy 
of the real world model but if that model is thought to be realistic, such 
an inconsistency points at a theoretical weakness of the agreement itself. The 
existence proof checks whether there are such weaknesses. The main test is that t1 
actions to be taken by the actors in the model should be defined for all 
relevant4 states of the world (the functions should be defined). 
Ad (ii): expl ic i tness  of an agreement 
The fact that an agreement has passed consistency tests does not imply that 
its consequences are clear. It is the modeller's task to clarify these con- 
sequences by making them explicit. 
(1) Explicitness of direct consequences. 
When an agreement has direct logical consequences, which are not expressed 
in the agreement itself, again analysis can help. We take the buffer stock 
agreement as an example: if only target prices and limits on stocks are 
introduced and no financial commitments, the agreement is consistent but 
insufficiently specified. By substituting the complementarity conditions 
within the budget equations, one can however derive the explicit specification 
of both the a priori commitment and the effective commitment. Any other 
specification would lead to inconsistencies. The analysis can thus also 
serve as a tool to investigate direct logical consequences of an agreement 
in order to make them an explicit part of the agreement itself. 
(2) Uniqueness of the consequences. 
In the previous example the financial consequences could be made explicit 
because the demand for buffer stock was related to the state of the world 
in a one to one fashion (net increase in buffer stocks = surplus on world 
4~bviously for states of the world which are irrelevant (= cannot occur) 
the rnodeller is free to formulate artificial actions (such as free disposal) 
if this simplifies his proofs. 
market). If the agreement is not so elaborated (i.e. if to one surplus on the 
market corresponds a whole range of net increases in stocks) a consistent 
solution can exist but the agreement itself is inadequately specified. Here 
analysis cannot help unveiling the implicit consequences, but the modeller 
can report that the agreement does not yet describe a concrete course of 
actlon and explain which degrees of freedom the model still possesses. 
Here the analysis of uniqueness of the solution is the relevant issue. 
(3) Explicitness of indirect consequences. 
Although theory can provide interesting insights, it is felt that the 
general problem of investigating consequences of international agreements on 
the world economy can only be handled through the developmeat of fully specified 
numerical models. The outcome of such models, strongly depends on the numerical 
values and functional specifications which are assumed, so that only very 
few lessons can be drawn from general theoretical nodels. One needs to run 
the model on the computer and evaluate the results. The thsoretical models 
must therefore be solvable numerically. 
13.3 Internal agreements 
In Chapter I1 no attention was given to internal international agree- 
ments. The reason for this is that for internal agreements the open exchange 
model (Chapter 11, para 3) more or less applies with the participating nations 
as the basic actors. The problem for such an interpretation of the model lies 
in the first place in the monotonicity requirement imposed on the actors 
Az (- > 0 ) .  The second problem, which is more severe, is that we require 
Ak = 
internal equilibrium to be unique. We have seen that this is the case as 
long as no buffer stock reaches its bound but in general we can only 
establish uniqueness in the absence of quota. The open exchange model 
has shown how a common price, quota and buffer stock policy can be 
modelled as an internal agreement. Two kinds of internal agreements 
still have to be discussed: a trade agreement and a scheme of compensatory 
finance . 
- In an economy with lagged production we can look at a trade agreement 
as an international redistribution of endowments before exchange. By itself such 
an agreement t h e r e f o r e  has  t he  same e f f e c t  a s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  income t r a n s -  
f e r ,  indexed, wi th  q u a n t i t i e s  t r aded  a s  weights .  There i n  p r a c t i c e  o f t e n  e x i s t s  
a r e l a t i o n  between quo ta s  and t r a d e  agreements: a count ry  which impor t s  a 
commodity under a t r a d e  agreement u sua l ly  i s  n o t  w i l l i n g  t o  l e t  t h a t  commodity 
be reexported and v i c e  ve r sa  f o r  t h e  expor t e r .  These two e f f e c t s  must be 
d i s t i ngu i shed  
A t r a d e  agreement w i l l  have a s  i t s  f i r s t  consequence a h ighe r  degree  of 
pseudo-autarky: a f t e r  t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  endowments and a t  "normal" world 
market p r i c e s  t h e  n e t  demands of  t h e  n a t i o n s  w i l l  be smaller, s o  t h a t  t h e  income 
e f f e c t  of a change i n  compet i t ive  world market p r i c e s  could b e  sma l l e r  i n  
abso lu t e  terms.  We s h a l l  see i n  t h e  appendix t o  t h i s  chap te r  +hat t h e  s i g n  o f  
such an e f f e c t  is  unc lea r  (depending on p r i c e  p o l i c y ,  TJo t a s ,  endowments o f  
t h e  income groups i n  t h e  n a t i o n ,  e t c . ) ,  it t h e r e f o r e  is  x?CZear what t h e  
o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  on t h e  compet i t ive  market w i l l  be .  It  howover; seems t o  be a 
p l a u s i b l e  con jec tu re  t h a t  a t r a d e  agreement d e s t a S i l i z e s  t h e  c c e e t i t i v e  market 
( i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  on equi l ib r ium p r i c e s  of shift il sapply  i n c r e a s e s )  
i f  t h e  expor t e r  is  less p r i c e  s e n s i t i v e  than  t h e  impor te r  and v i c e  ve r sa ,  t h e  
argument being t h a t  an expor t e r  has  a pe rve r se  weal th  e f f e c t  ( h e  g e t s  
r i c h e r  a s  p r i c e  goes up and might t h e r e f o r e  have a h ighe r  demand f o r  
h i s  own p r o d u c t ) .  I t  is r a t h e r  easy t o  b u i l d  counter  examples f o r  t h i s  
con jec tu re  and on ly  empi r i ca l l y  based models can g i v e  answers.  
The second e f f e c t  of t h e  t r a d e  agreement,  t h e  impos i t ion  of  quo ta s ,  is 
c l e a r l y  a decrease  of t h e  volume of goods t r a d a b l e  on t h e  compet i t ive  market. 
Espec i a l l y  when o v e r a l l  supply is  s u b j e c t  t o  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  and t h e  t r a d e  
agreement is  r i g i d ,  t h e  agreement w i l l  i n c r e a s e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  on t h e  compet i t ive  
market.  Under monopoly t h e  outcome could b e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  Consider  t h e  
b u f f e r  s t ocks  agency a s  such a monopolist .  Here a t r a d e  agreement could see t o  
i t  t h a t  i n i t i a l  s t o c k s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  of p r i c e  t a r g e t s  
and t h u s  f o r  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  I n  summary w e  can s t a t e  t h a t  t r a d e  agree-  
ments can e a s i l y  be implemented wi th in  t h e  models of Chapter I1 b u t  t h a t  t h e  
e f f e c t s  of  such agreements a r e  n o t  easy t o  p r e d i c t  02 t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds only.  
- A scheme of compensatory financing is an a r rangeoent  by which c o u n t r i e s  
agree to let international income transfers compensate fluctuations in export 
earnings. The International Monetary Fund operates such a scheme 
(compensatory financing facility (CFF). The European Community also 
5 
operates such a scheme as part of the Lome Agreement (STABEX) . One might think 
of it as an explicit specification of the transfer distribution function, (11.4 
e.g. 
where 
kh compensatory financing transfer to nation h - (kh E R) 
pW target (possibly average ) world price (FW E R?) 
pW actual world price (pW E R?) 
-h Y - ~  target (possibly average) supply, nation h (vh E R?+) 
-h 
Y- 1 actual supply, nation h (yh E R?+) 
6h = 1 for countries supported by the scheme, and 0 for countries supporting 6 it . 
o (pW) price index. 
This scheme stabilizes the purchasing power of total supplies, not of exports. 
This seems more rational because exports themselves are depending on the 
transfer. Obviously the effect of such a scheme on equilibrium prices cannot 
be predicted theoretically. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the IMF's scheme, see Junz and Mc Avoy ( 1 .  
13 - 4  Buffer stock agreements and the Nm International Economic Order 
Schemes of compensatory financing do not aim at changing world market 
prices. National governments receive the compensation and it depends on 
5 ~ h e  IMF scheme applies to a11 countries and to the balance of trade in general 
while the EC scheme only applies to 12 commodities and 16 countries (see 
Stakhovitch ( 3  1 ) . 
6 ~ h e  distinction supporting-supported does not imply that the sign of k should bt h 
the national solicy whether or not individual producer and consumer groups 
obtain any compensation. It has the character of an aid to the nation and 
the country giving aid can easily discriminate between receivers of aid. 
Developing countries raise objections to such aid schemes and demand price 
policies on international markets. In the 1960s the "no aid but trade" position 
gained wide support especially under the influence of Prebisch's view that 
there is a secular decline in terms of trade for primary commodity exporters 
(= the developing countries) (28, 16). The emphasis on trade naturally led to 
concern for export earnings, import payments and prices faced by the developing 
nations. Until 1973 trade liberalization on the part of the developed countries 
(preferential treatment), and compensatory financing schemes were the main 
concerns. After the "oil crisis" and the increase in agricultural prices in 
- 
1972-1973 the emphasis has shifted to the discussion on the "New International 
Economic Order". See for example U.N. World Food Conference 1974 (37), 
P.H. Trezise (351 ,  C. M'ichalopoulos, L.L. Perez (221, and D.L. McNicol 
(23). From this emerged the so-called Integrated Programme put forward 
by the developing nations at the UNCTAD IV conference in 1976. The central 
feature of this programme is the establishment of buffer stocks for 18 core 
commodities spmning the main exports of primary commodity producers. Agree- 
ments for separate coinmodities would have to be coordinated financially by 
a Common F'und7. The developed nations are not enthousiastic about this proposal 
(cf. Junz and McAvoy (17). The experience with commodity agreements has been 
rather disappointing (see Johnson (16)) and the introduction of an 
integrated cam06ity agreement implies that a monopolistic force would be 
given to the nations controlling it, the power of which could eventually 
have an important influence in international affairs. We shall presently 
return to this issue. A buffer stock scheme as is being proposed, cannot keep lon 
term prices far away from an equilibrium level because stocks would either get 
overfilled or depleted. But price stabiliiation itself can have favourable 
effects even when it is around a "secular equilibrium level". It can be argued 
that prices reach income groups within a nation more easily than aid flows do 
and price stabilization through buffer stock operations also has a stabilizing 
effect on aggregate demand (as was discussed in para 12 above). 
7 
IMF already operates such a buffer stock scheme. 
The market segmentation agreement could supplement the buffer stock agreement 
by absorbing structural surpluses and deficits on commodity markets. 
It has not been our aim to pass any judgement on the desirability of specific 
international agreements, only to sketch a background for the international 
models listed in Chapter 11. 
13.5 MonopoZistic interpretation of an internationaz ( e z t e m z )  agreement 
Alternative interpretations can be given to the external agree- 
ments. Instead of visualizing a dialogue between developed and developing 
nations which would finally result in an integrated scheme, one can also think 
of a cartel being set up unilaterally (as was the case with OPEC). The 
market segmentation model (Chapter 11, para 6! seeks especially suited for 
representing this. The model, howevex, has +he limitation t hz t  it lacks the 
capability of representing competing cartels. The bcffer stock model allows 
to consider independent cartels for different groups cf ccmodities 
simply by having the transfers distributed accordicg to =&exship of the 
cartel.. It can therefore describe cooperation as well as cocfxontation between 
cartels (e.g. the use of a food agreement against zn oil agreement). 
13.6 StructuraZ interpretation of the agreement 
A third interpretation of the agreement is to assume that it does 
not represent the explicit will of the participants but £oms a structural 
characteristic of the market: it is the "invisible" hand which acts as if there 
would exist an agreement. This interpretation turns the specification of the 
structure of the market into an empirical problem. This is a very hard 
task especially because the econometrics of models with complementarity 
conditions and unequality constraints are not yet well-established. Some steps 
in this direction have been taken e.g. by Fair and Jaffee (Illand 
Hartley and Mullela (18) but only in a partial equilibrium framework. 
In our system national models can be formulated, estimated and calibrated 
independently for given time series of international prices and deficits on 
the balance of trade. Once the national models are fully specified, the 
exogenous prices become endogenous through the international market (and 
therefore stochastically disturbed). The competitive model does not leave 
any scope for calibration at this level because the commodity balance does 
not contain any unknown coefficients. The buffer stock model permits some 
calibration since adjustment functions can be specified for LFle parameters 
(price targets, commitments, limits on stocks). Likewise, the compensatory 
financing scheme also has a structural interpretation as an in-built 
stabilizer but here more serious econometric estimation is possible because 
the functions involved can be made continuously differentiable and thereby 
suitable for maximum likehood estimation. 
Appendix 
NOTATION AND LIST OF VARIABLES 
Notation 
Rn n-dimensional real vector space 
R3 nonnegative n-dimensional real vector space 
R?+ positive n-dimensional real vector space 
t subscript for time ~eriod 
a.b scalar product: Clayb2 
1 1  1 
- 
: (C E R~ ( Yi : c = max (a bi) i i ' 
p(Rn) P(R?) CP(R?+) 
n power set in R R3 R3+ 
"is equal by assignment to" 
"is equal to" 
vector all components equal 1 
SUBSCRIPTS,  SUPERSCRIPTS RANGE 
commodity 
income group 
na t ion  
w i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy 
k  (depending on con tex t )  
d  s u b s c r i p t  o f  s l ack  country 
VARIABLE MEANING DIMENSION 
b d i r e c t  t a x  by income group R1 
t o t a l  d i r e c t  t a x  
sav ings  
t r a d e  d e f i c i t  
income of  income group 
p r i c e  index 
(domest ic)  p r i c e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  
domestic t a r g e t  p r i c e  
(upper bound on) i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t a r g e t  p r i c e  
lower bound on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t a r g e t  p r i c e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t a r g e t  p r i c e  
domestic f r e e  d i s p o s a l  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r e e  d i s p o s a l  
l e v e l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s tock  
lower bound on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t ock  
t a r g e t  l e v e l  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t ock  
upper bound on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t ock  
upward dev ia t i on  o f  s tock  from t a r g e t  
downward d e v i a t i o n  of s tock  from t a r g e t  
domestic b u f f e r  s t ock  
lower bound on domestic bu f f e r  s t ock  
t a r g e t  l e v e l  on domestic b u f f e r  s t ock  
upper bound on domestic b u f f e r  s tock  
supply by income group 
supply by nation 
demand by income group 
net import by nation 
lower bound on net import 
upper bound on net import 
net import by economy w 
A. 
lower bound on net import by economy w 
upper bound on net import by economy w 
satiation weight for demand 
upward deviation of domestic price from 
target 
upward deviation of international pice 
from target 
downward deviation of domestic price from 
target 
downward deviation of international price 
target 
scaling factor on domestic price target 
scaling factor on international price 
target 
satiation level for demand 
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